app/old/extension/README.md

Persimmons Chromium extension v0

A small load-unpacked experiment for the Persimmons authority model:

🍊 source authority -> Squeeze -> 💧 scoped authority -> agent

The extension is a capture + delegation surface, not a general password manager.

Load unpacked

1. Open chrome://extensions.
2. Enable Developer mode.
3. Choose Load unpacked.
4. Select this repository's extension/ directory.
5. Pin Persimmons.

There is no build step.

Taste test

Current-site session

1. Sign in normally to a test site such as wp.phly.cloud or teahub.xyz.
2. Open the Persimmons extension.
3. It shows the current site. The first capture on a site asks Chromium for access to that origin.
4. Choose Save this session.
5. Persimmons filters obvious analytics/consent cookies, caps the capture at 64 cookies / 16 KiB, and sends the session bundle once to the existing caller-scoped Persimmons create endpoint.
6. The backend stores the source value in Gitea Actions secrets. The extension receives only the public connection record.
7. Leave read site / edit drafts/pages enabled and choose Squeeze for agent.
8. A 💧 capability is created with one-hour expiry.
9. Choose Revoke juice. This revokes the capability metadata without deleting the source 🍊.

API token / PAT

Choose Use API token, paste the token, and save. The input is cleared after a successful write. The stored value is not returned by the Persimmons API.

What is stored

• 🍊 source credential/session: existing Persimmons Gitea Actions secret substrate, write-only after save.
• 🍊 metadata: existing Persimmons Gitea Actions variable metadata.
• 💧 Juice: separate capability metadata only (source id, origin, subject, scopes, expiry, status). Juice does not contain the source secret.
• Extension local storage: only the Persimmons public source id/name for the current origin. No raw cookie/token is intentionally persisted in extension storage.

The extension never prints captured cookie values or token values to the console.

Passkeys / WebAuthn

v0 does not export passkey private keys. Non-exportable key material stays in the authenticator. Persimmons should model the site/account/authenticator relationship and mediate future authorization rather than treating a passkey as a password blob.

Threat-model limitations

• A captured browser session can be high authority. v0 relies on the user's explicit origin permission and explicit Save this session action.
• Cookie heuristics are deliberately small and may capture more authority than a service-native scoped token. Prefer a provider-native PAT/OAuth grant where available.
• 💧 in v0 is real, revocable policy metadata. It does not yet execute downstream requests on behalf of an agent. The next executor/mediator must consume Juice + the stored source credential internally and return task results, never the source credential.
• Revoking Juice does not invalidate a live browser session at the source service.
• Compromise of the signed-in browser profile or Gitea account remains outside this extension's protection boundary.
• The broker currently lives at teahub.xyz, but Persimmons remains a standalone product surface and the extension has no Phly/Phast/Tea product dependency beyond that storage endpoint.